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Women's Representation in the Romanian Chamber of Deputies, 1992–2005

The Effect of District Economic Development

ABSTRACT: *Although representational inequality continues to attract researchers' attention, few studies embark on substantive discussions with regard to variations in women's parliamentary representation across electoral districts. In postcommunist countries, such studies are even more scarce, and Romania in particular has not been considered in this context. This article provides an empirical examination of: (1) the extent of inequality across districts with respect to the number of women in the Romanian Chamber of Deputies; (2) the relative stability of this inequality across multiple legislative periods; and (3) the contributions of economic development variables as determinants of representational inequality. Using a combination of data sources with electoral districts as the units of analyses reveals that although women's overall representation increased, inequality between districts is significant and remains stable across time. Furthermore, once a measure for women's parliamentary representation is standardized for district magnitude, level of economic development is a robust predictor of it, such that the greater the level of economic development, the greater the level of women's representation. Theoretical considerations conclude the article.*

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Women's underrepresentation in parliaments around the world continues to attract attention from scholars and activists alike. Changing the demographic landscape of political representation provides particular groups with the opportunity to better incorporate their unique experiences into the legislative process, thereby channeling the distribution of societal resources to their needs (Mansbridge 1999; Phillips 1995). Indeed, empirical studies show that gender matters in the parliamentary representation of interests: women legislators are more likely than their male colleagues to introduce women's issues and feminist bills into legislative consideration (Swers 2002; Thomas 1994; see also Ogmundson 2005: 319–23; Reynolds 1999: 548). In addition, women voters are more likely to become politically active where there are competitive and visible women candidates (Atkeson 2003). One cross-national study of wealthy, industrialized countries revealed that greater percentages of women in legislative positions positively impacts foreign policy in terms of providing development assistance (Breuning 2001). Despite the importance of women's representation in all democracies, both old and new, scholarship is much more concerned with the West European and American cases than with the rapidly transforming postcommunist East and Central European region.

Recent cross-national studies indicate that a variety of socioeconomic, political, ideological, and cultural factors influence cross-societal variation in female political representation (Kenworthy and Malami 1999; Moser 2001; Paxton and Kunovich 2003; Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005). A few studies of determinants of the number of women in parliaments of postcommunist societies with electoral districts as the unit of analysis stress such factors as district magnitude, party magnitude, and parties' rules and ideology (Chiva 2005; Matland and Montgomery 2003a; Saxonberg 2000; Siemienska 2003). However, studies of women's representation rarely embark on substantive discussions concerning the Romanian case, leaving this postcommunist country out of consideration (for communist-era Romania, see Fischer 1986; for the postcommunist era, see Chiva 2005).

This article empirically tests electoral district variation in Romanian women's parliamentary representation. Specifically, three empirical questions are addressed: (1) What is the extent of inequality across districts with respect to the number of women in the Romanian Chamber of Deputies? (2) Is this inequality stable across multiple legislative periods? (3) If the inequality perpetuates across time, what are its prime determinants?

Cross-district variation in women's parliamentary representation is an important aspect of social inequality. Despite gains in women's representation for the country as a whole, for the past five election cycles, Romanian women in some districts have had little to no representation from a democratically elected woman in the parliament. Ascertaining whether some districts have a history of electing (or not electing) women would show the full range of women's experiences with representational inequality. Such a history may influence women's propensity to become politically active (Atkeson 2003) or, perhaps, the chances of women candidates being elected in their districts in the future. However, the main issue here is

to find appropriate explanatory variables of this phenomenon. This article addresses a simple question in this regard: Is district economic development a good predictor of women's parliamentary representation? Romania is well suited for analyzing the impact of economic development because of its large intracountry variation along this dimension.

Theoretical Considerations and the Main Hypothesis

Previous research demonstrates that district magnitude is a prime determinant of women's parliamentary representation (Matland and Studlar 1996; Saxonberg 2000; Hogan 2001). District magnitude is typically measured either by total number of parliamentarians per district or by some indicator of population size, usually the number of voters. Obviously, districts with a higher total number of possible electoral seats have higher chances that women will occupy one of those seats. This result calls for a standardization of the number of women parliamentarians from a given district by the magnitude of this district.

Some researchers argue that party magnitude—that is, the number of seats occupied by a party in a particular district—should also be taken into account in explaining district variation in women's representation (Matland 1993; Saxonberg 2000; Schmidt and Saunders 2004). Proponents of this view argue that party magnitude reflects electoral seat allocation rules and measures the distribution of the vote (Schmidt and Saunders 2004: 713). While party magnitude is an interesting variable, this study focuses on district magnitude for both substantive and methodological reasons. Substantively, party magnitude is largely based on district magnitude. Results are mixed as to whether party magnitude is a stronger predictor than district magnitude, especially in East and Central Europe (Saxonberg 2000: 150). However, the correlation between the two measures is high. Thus, methodologically, both variables are colinear and, practically, both cannot be used in the type of analysis used here.

In cross-national analysis, economic development, as measured by gross domestic product and in the presence of a proportional representational system, is a positive and significant predictor of women's representation in parliament (Matland and Montgomery 2003a: 29–31). Economic development leads to resources women need to form bases of political power through political parties and social movements that focus on women's issues. In postcommunist societies, transformation to a market economy brought with it the rise of these parties and movements (Matland and Montgomery 2003b). Generally, those postcommunist countries that experienced high economic growth have more women in their parliaments than countries that experienced low economic growth.

Does the international pattern of the relationship between economic development and women's parliamentary representation have its counterpart at the intracountry district level? Within a given country, do electoral districts with a higher level of development have better women's parliamentary representation

than electoral districts with a lower level of development? Polish electoral districts reveal that in the 1997 election, the correlation between the number of elected women in the district and the percentage of urban population is strong (0.58) and statistically significant ($p < 0.001$) (Siemienska 2003: 234). This result suggests a positive answer to the question about the relationship between within-country economic development and women's parliamentary representation. However, the concept of economic development is a complex one, including not only urbanization but also industrialization and material well-being of the population. Romania, where there is great district variation in these dimensions of economic development, is a good case to study the economic determinants of women's parliamentary representation.

The main hypothesis is as follows: in Romania, women's parliamentary representation rises and falls with a given district's level of economic development. Whether this relationship is mediated by cultural and ideological factors associated with economic development is beyond the scope of this article. However, I assume that economic development is a prime factor in the chain of events leading to women's parliamentary representation.

Data and Measurement

Data

Data on the political and socioeconomic aspects of Romanian districts (judete) come from multiple sources. Data on women's representation in the national legislative body were taken from the Romanian parliament's Web site, focusing—as in well-established research—on the Lower House (Chamber of Deputies) (Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2003; Dolan 2001; McDermott 1997). The Web site covers the following legislative periods: 1992–96, 1996–2000, 2000–2004, and partially 2004–5.[1]

Data for district magnitude were taken from the data set of the project on Political Transformation and the Electoral Process in Post-Communist Europe from the University of Essex for the years 1992, 1996, and 2000. Data on socioeconomic conditions was coded from the *Romanian Statistical Yearbook 2004* on-line edition, from the Institutul National de Statistica.

Measurement

The Romanian parliament's Web site provides three ways to determine the gender of the parliamentarian: (1) by the name on the complete list of deputies, (2) by sorting parliamentarians by gender, and (3) by looking at the photographs displayed. All of these methods result in some inconsistencies regarding the number of women per district.[2] The number of women per district thus refers to the total number of women legislators in the Lower House, serving within the legislative

Table 1

Proportion of Women in the Romanian Chamber of Deputies from Last Communist Elections to Elections in 2004

Election	Proportion of women	*N*	World ranking[a]
1985[b]	34.4	—	—
1990[c]	6.1	343	—
1992[c]	4.7	328	—
1996[a]	7.0	328	67 out of 177
2000[a]	10.7	345	56 out of 178
2004[a]	11.2	332	75 out of 184

[a]Statistics from Inter-Parliamentary Union Web site www.ipu.org. World Ranking coded from first available rank after election.
[b]Includes the entire communist parliament. From Steven Saxonberg, "Women in East European Parliaments," *Journal of Democracy* 11, no. 2 (2000): 146; Eva Ruminska-Zimny, *The Gender Gap and the Transition Process in Countries of Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Baltic States* (New York: United Nations Development Programme, 1995), 47.
[c]From Romanian Chamber of Deputies (Lower House) Web site: www.cdep.ro.

period. As such, it includes those who left before the term was completed and their female replacements, as applicable. The data are presented in Appendix A.

District magnitude was measured in two ways: (1) number of parliamentarians per district and (2) total number of registered voters (in tens of thousands) per district. Three variables were used to index economic development: (1) percentage of urban population, (2) average net income (in lei), and (3) number employed in industry (per thousand). These three variables were subjected to principal component analysis, as explained later in this article. The differentiation of the district magnitude and overall economic development are presented in Appendix B. Basic information on all variables used in the analysis is provided in Appendix C.

Findings

Overview of Women's Parliamentary Representation Since 1985

Romanian women's overall representation in Parliament declined sharply after the fall of the official Romanian Communist Party (cf. Table 1). In 1985, women comprised 34 percent of the national parliament, among the highest in communist societies (Montgomery 2003: 2; Ruminska-Zimny 1995: 47).[3] Five years later, Romanian women comprised 6 percent of the Lower House. After the 1992 elec-

Table 2

Distribution of Female Parliamentarians from the Chamber of Deputies in all Electoral Districts, 1992–2005

District characteristics[a]	1992–1996	1996–2000	2000–2004	2004–2005
Average number of women per district	0.38	0.62	1	0.93
Standard deviation	0.54	0.83	2.02	1.50
Range	0–2	0–3	0–12	0–9
Number of districts without female parliamentarians[b]	27	23	23	19

[a]Total $N = 42$.
[b]Between 1992 and 2005, nine districts never had a female parliamentarian in the Lower House.

tion, the percentage of women in the Lower House grew steadily, reaching its peak at 11.2 percent in 2004. In comparison with the world, the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) ranks Romania on average in sixty-sixth place out of 180 or so democracies since 1996. As such, modern-day Romania is typical of other postcommunist societies, although toward the low end of their distribution (see Montgomery 2003: 8; Chiva 2005: 970).

The Relative Stability of Representational Inequality at the District Level

Table 2 illustrates both a growth trend in the number of women parliamentarians in the Lower House and growing inequality across districts ($N = 42$). The number of women per district increased across legislative periods after 1992–96, to about one per district after 2000, and reaching a maximum of twelve women during 2000–2004 (in Bucharest). However, for all districts the standard deviation increased, demonstrating growing inequality. While the number of districts without a woman in parliament gradually decreased, as of 2004–5, 45 percent of the districts did not have a female parliamentarian. Since Romania's sex ratio is approximately fifty/fifty, it can be estimated that over 4 million women had no one of their own gender as a representative in the Lower House.[4] The analogous figure for the 1990s is undoubtedly higher. Furthermore, between 1992 and 2005, a full 21 percent of all districts did not have a woman representative in the Lower House.

Tables 3 and 4 reveal that this inequality is relatively stable across time. If inequality were stable, correlations of the number of women parliamentarians in the Lower House per district between the current legislative period and the prior

Table 3

Correlations Between Numbers of Female Parliamentarians in Electoral Districts for Four Periods: 1992–1996, 1996–2000, 2000–2004, and 2004–2005

	1992–1996	1996–2000	2000–2004	2004– 2005
1992–1996	—	0.44	0.54	0.40
1996–2000		—	0.64	0.51
2000–2004			—	0.80
2004–2005				—

Note: For all correlations, $p < 0.01$

Table 4

Autoregression of Number of Female Parliamentarians per District in 2000–2004 and 2004–2005

Number of women parliamentarians in different periods	B	SE	Beta
	A. 2000–2004		
1996–2000	1.236***	0.313	0.504
1992–1996	1.176*	0.479	0.313
Constant	–0.213	0.303	
	B. 2004–2005		
2000–2004	0.601***	0.093	0.808
1996–2000	–0.200	0.228	–0.011
Constant	0.341†	0.179	
	C. 2004–2005		
2000–2004	0.616***	0.101	0.829
1996–2000	–0.006	0.233	–0.003
1992–1996	–0.134	0.324	–0.412
Constant	0.367†	0.192	

***$p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$; †$p < 0.10$, two-tailed test.

one would be strong and positive. Table 3 shows this to be the empirical reality. Correlations increase from 0.44 for the 1992–96 and the 1996–2000 legislative periods, and to 0.80 for the 2000–2004 and 2004–5 legislative periods. Ordinary least squares regression (OLS) analyses indicate that the number of women in

Table 5

Regression of Number of Female Parliamentarians in 2004–2005 on Two Measures of District Magnitude

	Model I			Model II		
	B	SE	Beta	B	SE	Beta
Total number of parliamentarians	0.202***	0.022	0.826			
Number of registered voters per 10,000				0.052***	0.005	0.832
Constant	–0.958***	0.243		–1.245***	0.263	
R^2	0.680			0.693		

Note: Correlation between two measures is .974***.
***$p < 0$ .001; **$p < 0$ .01; *$p < 0$ .05; †$p < 0.10$.

the legislative period immediately prior to the current one is a robust predictor of current level (cf. Table 4). A district's history of electing women is therefore a strong predictor of its current propensity for placing women in the Lower House.

The Importance of District Magnitude

To test whether district magnitude influences district variation in the representation of women in the Lower House, I regressed current number of women parliamentarians on the total number of parliamentarians (model 1) and the total number of registered voters per 10,000 (model 2) (see Table 5). Both models 1 and 2 demonstrate that district magnitude is a robust predictor of women's representation, explaining 68 percent and 69 percent of the variance, respectively. The correlation between the two independent variables is 0.97 ($p < 0.001$), indicating that they measure district magnitude about equally well.

Introducing Economic Development to Models of District Variation in Women's Parliamentary Representation

To determine whether economic development is a useful predictor of women's parliamentary representation, I created an index of economic development using three economic indicators: (1) percentage of urban population, (2) average net income, and (3) the number of employees working in industry. The results of principal component analysis can be interpreted as follows: the higher the index score, the higher the economic development.

Table 6

Measurement of Economic Development and Distribution of Its Components

	Factor loadings*	Mean	Standard deviation
Urban	0.842	0.487	0.153
Income	0.898	4,593,815.90	502,454.07
Industry	0.719	48.795	33.292

*Eigenvalue = 2.034; explained variance = 67.8 percent.

Table 6 presents the measurement of the index and the distribution of its components. Factor loadings are high (ranging from 0.719 to 0.898), indicating that there is a high correlation between each of the variables and the factor. The eigenvalue associated with the factor is greater than 2, and the explained variance is almost 68 percent. Thus, the measurement model fulfills the basic statistical requirements.

To determine whether economic development contributes to overall variation, I standardized the dependent variable, number of women parliamentarians per district, with measures of district magnitude, to create two new dependent variables: (1) number of women parliamentarians per number of total parliamentarians, and (2) number of women parliamentarians per 10,000 registered voters. As previously discussed, such standardization is justified in that on the district level both the total number of parliamentarians and number of registered voters per 10,000 are prime predictors of the number of female parliamentarians. In addition, it is worth noting that district-level economic development is highly correlated with district magnitude measured by either the total number of parliamentarians (0.805, $p < 0.001$) or the total number of registered voters per 10,000 (0.826, $p < 0.001$). Such high correlations indicate that the standardization is an appropriate solution for avoiding potential co-linearity problems.

Table 7 reveals that economic development is a good predictor of the standardized measures of female parliamentary representation—at the 0.10 level of statistical significance for the two-tailed test. However, because N is small, the model is particularly susceptible to outliers. One district, Mehendinti, scores very high on the standardized measures of women's representation for 2004–5 and very low on the economic development index. When this district is removed from the equation, economic development is a robust predictor of both standardized measures, explaining about 11 percent of the variance. Its impact is statistically significant at the 0.05 level.

According to the model presented in Table 7, an increase in economic development by one standard deviation produces an increase in proportion of female par-

Table 7

Regression of Standardized Measures of Female Parliamentarian Representation in 2004–2005 on Economic Development

	Full model				Model without an outlier			
	B	SE	Beta	*t*	B	SE	Beta	*t*
	A. Women parliamentarians per number of total parliamentarians							
Economic development	3.219†	1.708	0.286	1.885	3.162*	1.406	0.339	2.249
Constant	9.998***	1.688		5.924	9.027***	1.406		6.421
R^2	0.080				0.120			
	B. Women parliamentarians per 10,000 registered voters							
Economic development	0.006†	0.003	0.288	1.905	0.006*	0.003	0.323	2.131
Constant	0.019***	0.003		6.104	0.017***	0.003		6.302
R^2	0.080				0.100			

***$p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$; †$p < .10$, two-tailed test.

liamentarians by slightly more than 3 percent. As shown in Appendix B, three districts—Botosani, Calarasi, and Giurguiu—have values on the economic development scale of at least one standard deviation below the mean. If these districts improve economic performance to the mean level, their women's parliamentary representation would change considerably: in Botosani from 14.3 percent to 17.5 percent, in Calarasi from 20.0 percent to 23.5 percent, and in Giurgui from 0.0 percent to 3.2 percent. It is worth noting, however, that in the Botosani and Calarasi, the observed value (14.3 percent and 20.0 percent, respectively) is much higher than predicted (in both cases below 7.0 percent). In contrast, for Bucharest the observed value is 27.6 percent and predicted value is lower, below 25.0 percent. These examples illustrate a complicated pattern of district economic development and women's parliamentary representation as revealed by the regression analysis.

Discussion

In this article, I empirically examined the relative stability of inequality in women's parliamentary representation across electoral districts and legislative periods. The study revealed large inequality between districts. Although this representation increased over electoral periods, inequality between districts became a stable phenomenon. Showing the overall pattern in this respect, I focused on the potential contributions of economic development as an important determinant of within-country parliamentarian representation of women. I found that once a measure for women parliamentarians is standardized by district magnitude, level of economic development is a robust predictor of women's parliamentarian representation.

Future research should also determine the degree to which elections, as mechanisms to bring forth representative parliaments in a diverse ecological setting, actually perform this function. Additional analyses show that in the 2004 elections, women averaged 27 percent of the total candidates per district, with a standard deviation of 3.1. If elections were completely unbiased, the Lower House would have around 27 percent women. However, the proportion of women elected during this legislative period was only 11.2 percent. Moreover, the relationship between the proportion of women candidates and the proportion of women parliamentarians is weak ($r = 0.15$, $p = 0.331$). It is important to note, however, that in a regression equation with the percentage of female parliamentarians as the dependent variable, the impact of economic development remains significant even when the percentage of women candidates is controlled.[5] This finding calls into question the ability of elections, in and of themselves, to implement descriptive representation in terms of placing women into parliament according to their proportion as candidates (not to mention their proportion in the population) in an ecologically diverse setting.

Although improved economic development may lead to increased chances for women to become parliamentarians, other factors should be considered as well. Party-level dynamics, such as political platforms and the institution of effective quotas, are

additional pieces to the puzzle (Matland and Montgomery 2003a). Chiva (2005) demonstrates that party ideology in Romania influences women's representation in the Lower House, such that postcommunist parties have the highest level of commitment to women's representation, while right-wing extremist and ethnic parties have a comparatively lower level of women's legislative recruitment. As for gender quotas, they are not mandatory in Romania and only a few parties voluntarily adopt them (IDEA 2005). Moreover, ideological factors associated with district demographics and women's mixed status heritage during the communist era (Fischer 1998) may impact cross-district variation. Future research should include these factors to determine the extent to which they complement economic development as determinants of women's parliamentary representation in the postcommunist context.

Notes

1. Because Web site data for the Bucharest and Ilfov districts for the 1990–1992 legislative period are aggregated, I omitted them from the analyses.

2. For example, the sorting indicated in (2) did not retrieve all women parliamentarians present during a given legislative period and had to be supplemented through examining photographs and looking through the nonsorted list of parliamentarians. This occurred only for the 1996–2000 legislative period. Photographs were the most reliable way of identifying gender and provided for the majority of this type of data.

3. Evidence suggests that women's relatively high representation was in large part due to political pressure from the ruling Ceauşescu family, both Nicolae and Elena, who mandated quotas for women in political and economic spheres (Fischer 1985, 1998). Although women's representation was somewhat high for its time, women held positions without much real power, such as the local governing People's Councils and the Grand National Assembly, both under some of the strictest controls in the communist bloc (see Fischer 1985: 128).

4. Based on population counts in the *Romanian Statistical Yearbook 2004* on-line edition, from the Institutul National de Statistica, table 20.3.

5. Note that this result is consistent with Siemienska (2003: 234–35), who used correlation coefficients to argue that district magnitude has a positive but nonsignificant effect on the proportion of women candidates in Poland's 1997 elections.

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Appendix A

Number of Female Parliamentarians per District, per Legislative Period, 1992–2005

District	1992–1996	1996–2000	2000–2004	2004–2005
1 Alba	0	0	0	0
2 Arad	1	0	1	1
3 Arges	0	0	0	1
4 Bacau	0	0	4	2
5 Bihor	0	0	0	1
6 Bistrita-Nasaud	0	0	0	0
7 Botosani	1	1	2	1
8 Brasov	0	0	1	0
9 Braila	1	1	2	1
10 Buzau	0	0	0	0
11 Caras-Severin	0	1	1	0
12 Calarasi	0	0	0	1
13 Cluj	0	0	0	1
14 Constanta	1	0	1	0
15 Covasna	0	0	0	0
16 Dambovita	1	1	1	1
17 Dolj	0	1	2	2
18 Galati	1	3	4	0
19 Giurgiu	1	0	0	0
20 Gorj	0	0	0	0
21 Harghita	0	0	0	0
22 Hunedoara	0	0	0	2
23 Ialomita	0	0	0	0
24 Iasi	0	2	1	1
25 Ilfov	0	1	0	1
26 Maramures	1	1	2	1
27 Mehedinti	0	0	1	2
28 Mures	0	1	0	1
29 Neamt	1	1	0	0
30 Olt	1	1	1	0
31 Prahova	1	2	2	3
32 Satu Mare	0	0	0	1
33 Salaj	0	0	0	0
34 Sibiu	0	1	0	2
35 Suceava	0	2	1	2
36 Teleorman	1	0	0	0
37 Timis	0	1	2	0
38 Tulcea	0	0	0	0
39 Vaslui	1	1	0	1
40 Valcea	1	0	0	1
41 Vrancea	0	1	1	0
42 Bucuresti	2	3	12	9

Appendix B

District Magnitude and Level of Economic Development, 2004–2005

District	Number of parliamentarians	Number of registered voters	Level of economic development
1 Alba	6.00	315,371	0.112
2 Arad	7.00	383,157	0.009
3 Arges	9.00	528,262	0.604
4 Bacau	10.00	575,245	0.333
5 Bihor	10.00	493,032	0.054
6 Bistrita–Nasaud	5.00	246,523	–0.845
7 Botosani	7.00	364,487	–1.060
8 Brasov	9.00	489,912	1.193
9 Braila	5.00	310,084	–0.046
10 Buzau	7.00	407,123	–0.581
11 Caras–Severin	6.00	278,996	–0.338
12 Calarasi	5.00	256,970	–1.095
13 Cluj	10.00	576,902	0.992
14 Constanta	12.00	583,689	1.090
15 Covasna	4.00	177,682	–0.758
16 Dambovita	9.00	420,598	–0.402
17 Dolj	10.00	595,918	0.207
18 Galati	9.00	502,115	0.573
19 Giurgiu	4.00	231,626	–1.225
20 Gorj	6.00	290,970	0.667
21 Harghita	5.00	263,853	–0.628
22 Hunedoara	8.00	415,243	1.539
23 Ialomita	4.00	237,335	–0.902
24 Iasi	12.00	623,878	–0.159
25 Ilfov	5.00	213,337	–0.762
26 Maramures	9.00	413,813	–0.130
27 Mehedinti	4.00	247,095	0.058
28 Mures	8.00	476,053	0.337
29 Neamt	8.00	460,513	–0.884
30 Olt	7.00	398,116	–0.227
31 Prahova	15.00	678,113	0.893
32 Satu Mare	5.00	305,817	–0.379
33 Salaj	4.00	201,502	–0.497
34 Sibiu	7.00	350,865	0.474
35 Suceava	13.00	538,840	–0.683
36 Teleorman	7.00	370,820	–0.648
37 Timis	11.00	556,371	1.004
38 Tulcea	5.00	204,460	–0.380
39 Vaslui	7.00	362,191	–0.790
40 Valcea	6.00	337,720	–0.367
41 Vrancea	6.00	310,039	–0.856
42 Bucuresti	33.00	1,705,091	4.503

Appendix C

Description of Variables

Variable name	Description	Source
Number of female parliamentarians	Total number of women parliamentarians in a given district in a given legislative period.	Romanian Chamber of Deputies Web site[a]
Total number of parliamentarians	Total number of candidates in a given district in a given legislative period. Derived from the total number of photographs on the Romanian parliament Web site per district per legislative period.	Romanian Chamber of Deputies Web site[a]
Total number of registered voters	Total number of registered voters in a given district in a given legislative period.	Political Transformation and the Electoral Process in Post-Communist Europe data set from the University of Essex Web site[b]
Percent of urban population	Percent of the district that contains an urban population as of July, 2003.	*Romanian Statistical Yearbook 2004* on-line edition, from the *Institutul National de Statistica*, table 20.3[c]
Income	Average net nominal monthly earnings for the total economy of the district in 2003.	*Romanian Statistical Yearbook 2004* on-line edition, from the *Institutul National de Statistica*, table 20.58[c]
Industrial employment	Civil employment in industry per thousand people in 2003.	*Romanian Statistical Yearbook 2004* on-line edition, from the *Institutul National de Statistica*, table 20.15[c]

[a]Romanian Chamber of Deputies, www.cdep.ro (accessed November 15, 2005).
[b]University of Essex, Political Transformation and the Electoral Process in Post-Communist Europe project of the electoral database; available at www.essex.ac.uk/elections (accessed November 15, 2005).
[c]*Romanian Statistical Yearbook 2004*, www.insse.ro/anuar_2004/aseng2004.htm (accessed November 15, 2005).