The importance of party ideology: Explaining parliamentarian support for political party gender quotas in Eastern Europe

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The importance of party ideology: Explaining parliamentarian support for political party gender quotas in Eastern Europe

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Abstract
Party gender quotas are rules voluntarily adopted within political party structures that aim at securing a set percentage of women to appear on candidate lists in elections for political office. Although parliamentary support is critical to the adoption and enforcement of party gender quotas, empirical studies of parliamentary opinion on this matter are few, and none are concerned with countries of Eastern Europe. In the context of Poland, this study addresses two main questions: (a) why do some parliamentarians support party gender quotas? And (b) what are the most important reasons? Using survey data on Polish parliamentarians, I examine the role of three major determinants of variation in party gender quota support: parliamentarian’s gender; economic and religious political party ideologies; and placement on the candidate list. Cross-tabulations reveal that women parliamentarians and parliamentarians from parties with economic statist and anti-clerical ideologies are more likely to support quotas than are those from economic liberal and Catholic traditionalist parties. In addition, parliamentarians placed low on the party’s electoral list in the previous election are more likely to support quotas than those placed at the top. Logistic regression analyses including all these determinants show that the only statistically significant effects pertain to economic and religious party ideologies. Discussion of the theoretical implications of party ideology being the most important explanatory factor for parliamentary support of party gender quotas concludes this article.

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Introduction

Throughout Eastern Europe, a growing number of political parties are adopting gender quotas designed to increase the proportion of women in national legislatures (Antic, 2003; Dahlerup, 2006a). Party gender quotas are rules voluntarily adopted within political party structures that aim at securing a set percentage of women appearing on candidate lists in elections for political office. While rapidly accumulating research strongly suggests that quotas have great potential in reducing gender political inequality, the relationship between quotas and this outcome is complex, depending on the form of electoral rules, the type of quota adopted and the level of enforcement of the quota (Caul Kittilson, 2006; Matland, 2006; Matland and Montgomery, 2003b).

Parliamentarian support is a critical factor in the adoption and enforcement of party gender quotas, the type political parties in Eastern Europe most often embrace (Caul Kittilson, 2006; Dahlerup, 2006b; Krook, 2006). Although part of the decision to adopt a party gender quota rests with party leaders – who can act in opposition to the normative concerns about quotas held by the rank-and-file members of their parliamentary club – rank-and-file parliamentarians are still central to this process (Renc-Roe, 2003). Through interacting with the media, parliamentarians influence voter support for quotas, and through their role in the legislative process they are the only ones capable of turning party gender quotas into electoral law, for example, legal gender quotas.1 They are also potentially active monitors and enforcers of existing quotas.

In this study, I address two main questions: (a) why do some parliamentarians support party gender quotas in Eastern Europe? And (b) which reasons are the most important? Using survey data on parliamentarians in Poland, I examine the role of the three major explanations for party gender quota support: parliamentarian demographics, party ideology and candidate list experience.

Empirical studies of the determinants of parliamentarian support are few, and none are concerned with countries of post-communist Eastern Europe. One study of parliamentarians from the United Kingdom found that demographics and party ideology exert independent effects on parliamentarian attitudes, where women from leftist parties are more likely than their male colleagues to support gender quotas (Lovenduski and Norris, 2003). Research on attitudes to gender quotas in Brazil produced similar results, despite different data and control variables (Htun and Power, 2006). Both studies rely on indices that measure attitudes to a variety of gender policies, without distinguishing between quota types or between elements of party ideology. Thus, we know little about the specific elements of party ideology that are most important in explaining parliamentarian support. Moreover, in most other empirical studies, parties, rather than parliamentarians, are the units of analysis (e.g. Chiva, 2005; Davidson-Schmich, 2006).

Two surveys of Polish parliamentarians allow me to examine determinants of parliamentarian support for gender quotas, including gender, party ideology and placement on
the electoral list, as well as the relative importance of the specific covariates. Given the scarce scholarship on gender quotas and women’s representation in post-communist Europe, this case study brings new insights to the women and politics literature, providing direction for future studies of similar phenomena in similar places (see also Antic and Lokar, 2006; Dahlerup, 2006a; Fischer, 1998; Matland and Montgomery, 2003a).

Poland’s economic and political situation makes it a crucial case for addressing the questions of parliamentarian support for party gender quotas and the reasons behind them. Contemporary Poland is typical of Eastern European countries that have experienced radical social change and are now adopting Western European-style economic and political systems. Economically, Poland’s market economy shows considerable growth, though it still retains labour market problems common to Eastern Europe, including high unemployment among women (Central Statistical Office, 2007; Glass, 2008). Gendered economic inequality has implications for the recruitment and electoral success of women, forcing the issue of gender quotas as a means of reducing gender inequality (Paxton and Hughes, 2007). Politically, like much of Eastern Europe, Poland has considerable party fluidity (Zielinski et al., 2005), which enables rank-and-file parliamentarians to escape accountability and, to a great extent, party discipline, and gives them considerable autonomy. Historically, quotas – in terms of representation as well as economic production – were commonplace during the communist era and are thus a familiar topic in Poland. This means that parliamentarians most likely have strong views on the subject of gender quotas for their own party.

History of quota adoption in contemporary Poland

Stories of women’s representation converge and diverge within post-communist Europe (Irvine, 2007). In the Balkans, for example, gender quotas gradually emerged after much resistance (Antic and Lokar, 2006). Poland’s story is more typical of the experience of Eastern Europe, allowing for some generalizations within this region.

In post-communist Poland, the debate on the notion of gender party quotas began in the early 1990s. Quotas were adopted in 1994 by UP (Unia Pracy [Labour Union]) – a statist, anti-clerical party – instituting a 30 percent quota for its candidate list (Renc-Roe, 2003; Siemienska, 2003). In the 1997 election, UP failed to clear the 5 percent electoral threshold and thus the quota did not place women in parliamentary seats. In 1999, the statist, anti-clerical bloc SLD–UP (SLD stands for Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej [Alliance of the Democratic Left]) and economic liberal, anti-clerical party UW (Unia Wolnosci [Freedom Union]) both adopted 30 percent gender quotas for candidate lists (Siemienska, 2003). Opposition to the quota among SLD’s rank-and-file parliamentarians focused on (a) doubts about the ability of the party to fill that many list positions with women, and (b) their frustration that the decision had been forced upon them by the party leadership rather than their being given a vote on the matter (Renc-Roe, 2003: 17). Through ‘research into its electorate’, UW decided that implementing gender quotas would be a good way of boosting the female vote; party leadership wanted to place ‘at least one woman in the top three places on each list’ (Renc-Roe, 2003: 18). Despite the decision being subject to a party-wide vote, there was strong intra-party opposition (Renc-Roe, 2003: 18). In the 2001 elections, SLD won a landslide victory, while UW failed to gain a single seat.
Recent quota legislation history shows that quota adoption is a complex process governed at least as much by party ideology as by gender. In 2002, a bill proposing to establish a legal quota and that stipulated a regular increase in the minimum percentage of women, from 30 percent in 2003 to 50 percent in 2012, did not come to a roll-call vote (Siemieniska, 2003). Siemieniska writes: ‘Opponents [to the bill] are from the parliamentary opposition, consisting of male and female deputies of centre-right and right-wing parties’ (2003: 80). The fact that some women parliamentarians also opposed the bill suggests variation by gender in support of quotas.

With the limited support for party gender quotas and a relatively lukewarm reception for establishing legal quotas, women’s representation in the Polish Sejm could best be characterized as slow-rising with plateaus. Between 1991 and 2007, women’s parliamentary representation in Poland started at 9 percent of the Sejm, reached a plateau at 13 percent for two elections and rose to a little over 20 percent by 2001, remaining at this level after the elections of 2005 and 2007. In 2001, SLD dominated the government, but by 2005 the rise of economic liberals and Catholic traditionalists changed the party composition of the Sejm. Considering this history, I expect variation in quota support not only between parties, but also within parties that have, or have recently had, quotas.

Theory and hypotheses
Parliamentarian demographics

Many theorists of women’s political under-representation assume that parliamentarian demographics influence attitudes to representation policy such as gender quotas, but the empirical research is scant. In this article, I am concerned with parliamentarians’ gender and its relationship to two major forms of representation: substantive representation, which refers to the realization of citizen interests in policy outcomes, including gender quotas, and descriptive representation, which refers to the extent to which the composition of parliament resembles the demographic and experiential diversity of the citizenry (for extensive discussion on representation, see Manin et al. [1999] and Pitkin [1972]; for women’s representation, see Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler [2005]).

Gender representation theorists often contend that demographic characteristics of parliamentarians influence what parliamentarians think and do; thus, descriptive representation is a critical factor in determining whose voice in the legislature is heard, when and how loud (Mansbridge, 1999: 628; 2003: 523; see also Pitkin, 1972: ch. 4; Phillips, 1995; Young, 1990: 184–8). It matters, because descriptive representatives (those who embody a demographic and/or experiential subset of the population) translate shared experiences into substantive representation. In this context, women legislators are said to be the best representatives of women constituencies because they can draw upon a shared gendered experience. Empirical research shows that female parliamentarians are indeed more likely to introduce women’s interest policy than are their male colleagues (Swers, 2002; see also Xydias, 2008).

Descriptive representation links to pro-quota attitudes by a sense of group consciousness. Women, because of their experiences as members of a disadvantaged
group, empathize with the plight of women seeking to become members of the political elite. Gender consciousness arises from common hardship and manifests into political attitudes, including support for quotas (Burns, 2007). While within-group diversity produces variation in gender attitudes (Dovi, 2002: 730–1), the theoretical literature suggests the following hypothesis.

Hypothesis 1: Women parliamentarians are more likely to favour party gender quotas than men are.

If empirical analyses lend support to the statement above, changes in parliamentarian demographics could have profound consequences for the future of quota policy in a given country, as an increase in women parliamentarians would make gender quota adoption more common. In this scenario, parties may change, but as long as there are steady increases in women’s representation, the likelihood of quota adoption increases (for a debate on the related issue of critical mass, see Childs and Krook [2006] and Grey [2006]).

Among academics there is widespread agreement that gender quotas can enhance descriptive representation, yet there is disagreement as to their necessity. While Mansbridge argues that, ‘as I write, significant representation by gender cannot be achieved in any existing polity without some form of quota’ (2005: 622), Dahlerup and Freidenvall (2005: 27) present a contrary view: ‘Major historical leaps in women’s parliamentary representation can occur without quota provisions.’ A more critical factor, however, is whether parliamentarians feel that quotas are necessary.

Party ideology

Party ideology is an important factor in explaining quota support (Davidson-Schmich, 2006), yet no single study has examined the competing influences of demographics and party ideology on individual parliamentarian attitudes to party gender quotas. Although female parliamentarians – independently of party affiliation – are more likely to introduce policy different from that of their male colleagues, empirical research indicates that party ideology exerts its greatest influence on roll-call behaviour (see Swers, 2002; Xydias, 2008). This suggests that party ideology is the more important factor for parliamentarian support of party gender quotas.

Party ideology is time- and place-specific. In contemporary Poland, party ideology aligns primarily along economic and religious dimensions (Castle and Taras, 2002: 113–14). I assume that parliamentarians choose parties that align, if not perfectly, with their attitudes on economic and religious matters. Party ideologies both reflect and reinforce parliamentarian attitudes, though diversity of opinion within parties is expected.

Economic platforms in Poland range from statism to economic liberalism. Statist parties comprise former Nomenklatura members and current leftists who advocate a welfare state that approximates the relative economic security of the communist era but does not include a centrally planned economy (Rueschemeyer, 1999). Economic liberals favour reliance on market forces and limited government interference in economic affairs, arguing that economic security is best handled by a laissez-faire government:
Hypothesis 2: The more statist a given parliamentarian’s party is in its economic platform, the more likely that parliamentarian is to support party gender quotas.

There are two reasons for this expectation. First, statism shares an intellectual compatibility with the leftist ideology of encouraging social diversity. Communism produced some of the world’s highest levels of descriptive representation for a wide variety of groups (though without the corresponding increase in power) (Krupavicius and Matonye, 2003: 84; Montgomery, 2003: 2). In so much as statist parties reflect the ideals of communism, descriptive representation is compatible with their intellectual foundations. Second, statism has an affinity for strong government intervention in the social structure as means of reducing social inequality, an idea compatible with that of instituting gender quotas through modifying party rules.

Conversely, the conservative and rightist ideological orientation that economic liberals have should make them the most likely to reject quotas. Conservatives and rightists typically focus on individualized, rather than on structural, explanations for social inequality. Though adoption is voluntary, gender quotas are seen as de-emphasizing individual initiative for solving social problems.

As Poland is predominantly Catholic, the religious dimension of party platforms ranges from Catholic traditionalist to anti-clerical. To anti-clericals, religious influence in political affairs is largely incompatible with the administration of modern democracies. Anti-clericals champion the notion of diversity and equality between social groups. Catholic traditionalists, on the other hand, favour Catholic fundamentalist readings of the Christian bible as the foundation for social action and contend that religion provides a sound ideological basis for both democracy and civil society.2

Catholicism in Poland has a complex relationship with post-communist politics, informed by its central teachings and its history with the communist regime (Ramet, 1990). Essential to Catholicism is a reliance on tradition, and in this sense all practising Catholics affiliated with the Church are traditionalists (McGovern, 1990: 28). Communism was largely incompatible with Catholicism for precisely this reason. Catholics regarded communism as a revolution upturning their cherished traditions, while the communist party did all they could to minimize the influence of local religious organizations and the Vatican (Chrypinski, 1990; Mach, 2000). Contemporary Catholicism should not be read as monolithic, however. Differentiation within its following on views pertaining to the economy, cultural values and the role of the state in intervening on behalf of the stranger and the poor (see Matthew 25: 31–46) add to this complexity. Notwithstanding the level of diversity within Catholicism, Catholic traditionalist parties tend to be conservative and, thus, predictable in the degree to which they espouse Catholic social teachings.

Though essential Catholic teachings on concern for human dignity and principles of justice could, prima facie, place Catholic traditionalists at the forefront of quota policy, Poland’s religiously conservative history would make them less likely to support party gender quotas. In particular, this ideological position is influenced by the Catholic teaching of ‘the need for state intervention balanced with a concern to limit state control’ (McGovern, 1990: 28) combined with a conservative outlook and a history of resisting communist ideals of manufacturing diversity within the political
sphere. Taken together, this spells difficulty for the idea of party gender quotas taking an intellectual hold.

Considering the history of their stance on the gender division of labour, Catholic conservatives would be the least likely to favour party gender quotas as a way of increasing the number of women in parliament. Espousing a belief that women are central to the domestic sphere is largely incompatible with mass numbers of women working as parliamentarians; the idea of placing an equal ratio of women to men in parliament is likely to be rejected.

That said, some Christian rightist conservative parties claim gender representativeness. These parties court the women’s vote by appealing to religious sentiments while at the same time claiming to see individuals as discrete entities free to think and act independently of their social group context. In an apparent contradiction, Catholic traditionalist parties bank on group processes. Women, they argue, are more religious than men, and will be more likely – as a group – to vote along religious lines (Krupavicius and Matonye, 2003: 94–5). A sizeable proportion of Catholic traditionalist parties will claim that women are well represented in their party. As one woman in a Christian conservative party in Lithuania said: ‘It appears that for our party [gender parity] is not a problem. We have enough women working in important positions because of their professional qualities, not because they are women’ (Krupavicius and Matonye, 2003: 95):

*Hypothesis 3*: The more anti-clerical the party is in religious platform, the more likely the parliamentarian from that party is to support party gender quotas.

Considering that statists are for direct intervention in organizational structure and anti-clericals champion demographic diversity, I expect their combination to be the ideal support base for implementing quotas. Other combinations that have statism or anti-clericalism as only one of the dimensions would be less likely than its combination, but more likely than without either of these dimensions:

*Hypothesis 4*: Interaction of statism and anti-clericalism produces the highest level of parliamentarian support for party gender quotas, above and beyond the effects of other determinants.

If attitudes to quotas are driven primarily by party ideology, then an increase in women parliamentarians would not automatically improve the chances of quota adoption; instead, adoption would be dependent on the party composition of the government. In this scenario, an increase in women would not directly bring about a change in party gender quota policy.

**Candidate list experience**

Candidate experience is an under-studied influence on quota support. Yet, from the decision to run for parliament, to negotiating party gatekeepers, to going out on the campaign trail, running for office has great potential to influence policy attitudes once in office, including support for party gender quotas.
One aspect of women’s experience is their placement on the party’s candidate list. In proportional representation systems, having one’s name placed in an advantageous position is crucial to securing a seat. The safe positions are generally at the top of the list, though ‘safety’ is determined by the total number of candidates on the list, the size of the party within the electoral district and the party’s vote-share based on previous electoral performance. Party leaders determine placement on the list. Women from parties that seek to establish gender parity tend to be placed in safe positions. The example of Swedish parliamentarian Lena Hjelm-Wallén illustrates this tactic:

The Party nominated me as number three on the candidate list and as the party received six mandates in the county I got elected to parliament... It was an understanding within the party that of these six seats we got in my county at least one must be a woman. This kind of thinking came to a large extent from the top leadership within the party. The Prime Minister ... and his successor ... were very focused on the fact that they must seek to have a more equal composition within the party. (Available at: http://www.iknowpolitics.org/node/3197; accessed 1 May 2009)

In Eastern Europe, being placed in a hard-to-win position is often part of the candidate experience of women (Kunovich, 2003).

I argue that a rational gender consciousness links women’s candidate list experience to their support for party gender quotas. The reasoning is as follows: most party gender quota legislation is designed to configure candidate lists where women are placed in winning positions. Women are more likely than men to be placed low on the list, and female parliamentarians placed in a hard-to-win position have greater difficulty getting elected than those listed in a safer position (net of other factors related to parties and electoral contexts that influence how women win elections; see Caul-Kittilson, 2006). Women parliamentarians should be motivated by a mixture of self-preservation and gender consciousness to advocate party gender quotas as a useful way to boost their own political future as well as that of other women.

Considering that parliaments in Eastern Europe are disproportionately composed of men, a critical question is whether electoral list position also influences men’s attitudes to party gender quotas. To date, no study has addressed this issue. There are two plausible expectations for the Polish case on this matter. In one scenario, men would be against party gender quotas because of the greater probability that in future elections their party would list them below women, and thus in a hard-to-win position. This attitude is likely to develop in men who win despite holding a low position on the electoral list: because they know the feeling of vulnerability that comes with low placement, they would be against any policy – such as quotas – that would put them in such a precarious position in the future. This approach, however, does not take into account party ideology. Since party ideology is crucial for party gender quota support, it is reasonable to expect that male parliamentarians, including those placed low on electoral lists, would favour quotas to the extent their party ideology does. Men from pro-party gender quota-oriented parties who win despite their low list position may even feel emboldened by their candidate list ‘near-death’ experience, encouraging a pro-quota attitude:
Hypothesis 5: The lower the placement on candidate lists, the more likely are parliamentarians, women especially, to support party gender quotas.

Data


Polish Parliamentarian WebSurvey 2005

The Polish Parliamentarian WebSurvey 2005 is a survey of Polish parliamentarians in the Sejm on their attitudes to democracy, descriptive representation and party discipline (N = 86). It was conducted in June–July 2005 before the elections in the autumn of that year. The publically available webpage of the Sejm provided the sampling frame of potential respondents. By the standards of studies of elites, the response rate of 19 percent is a bit lower than average (for a discussion on problems securing interviews with politicians, see Maisel and Stone, 1998). However, the WebSurvey was representative of the 2001 Sejm (see Appendix A for a comparison between the WebSurvey and POLCAN). Selection bias is unlikely to influence the results, as respondents do not differ systematically from non-respondents (Winship and Mare, 1992).

The questionnaire was in Polish and consisted of a total of 10 questions, seven of which were fixed-choice questions. A research team constructed a webpage where parliamentarians, invited to participate via email, could access the survey. The survey was on one webpage, as opposed to multiple webpages, so respondents could pick and choose which questions they wanted to answer, much like a paper and pencil survey. They did not have to respond to a question in order to proceed further with the survey, which allowed them to stop at any time and still have all previous responses recorded. For fixed-choice items, respondents had to choose a response only if they made an initial mark.

POLCAN

POLCAN covers all parliamentarian candidates from the 1986, 1989, 1991, 1993, 1997 and 2001 national legislature elections in Poland (Zielinski et al., 2005). The data include demographics, electoral status (elected or not elected), party affiliation at year of election and position on the Sejm candidate list. Data were collected from a variety of sources, including the official election report (Wyniki Wyborow do Sejmu), the official webpage of the Polish parliament (Strona Internetowa Sejmu) and the annual statistical almanac (Rocznik Statystyczny).

Variables

Measuring support for party gender quotas and their determinants

In the WebSurvey, questions targeted attitudes to party gender quotas. For my analyses, the following item was important: ‘Some parties and other social groupings have
established a specific threshold (bottom limit) for the proportion of women who, on their behalf, should seek Sejm membership. Is this initiative good or bad?’ Respondents had to choose one of two possible answers coded as a dichotomous dependent variable: ‘good’ (scored 1) or ‘bad’ (scored 0). The response rate for this question was 93 percent.

Gender comes from merging the WebSurvey with POLCAN: woman = 1, man = 0.

Party ideology in 2001 is adapted from Castle and Taras (2002: 114, Figure 4.1), who created a party map along two dimensions: (a) economic, running horizontally, with statists in the east and economic liberals in the west; and (b) religious, running vertically, with anti-clericals in the north and Catholic traditionalists in the south. In broad terms, party ideology can be derived from party label placement in a particular quadrant. Identifying the proper quadrant required compromise. For example, SO (Samoobrona Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej [Self-Defense of the Polish Republic]) is squarely in the south-west, placing them as statists and Catholic traditionalists. SLD and UP formed a coalition, where SLD is largely on the statist side while UP is clearly on the economic liberalist side. Both lie near the anti-clerical pole. Taking the average, SLD–UP is statist and anti-clerical.5

To get a more sensitive measure of party ideology, I re-arranged Castle and Taras’s map with each axis running from 0 to 4, that is, the higher the score the more statist or anti-clerical (actual range 0.25 to 3.25).6 Because party labels did not fall neatly within whole units, I averaged the scores that border the party label. For example, SO, which falls between 3 and 3.25 on the economic axis and 1 and 1.5 on the religion axis, receives scores of 3.15 and 1.25, respectively (see Appendix B for scores by party).

Candidate list position is a numerical variable reflecting the parliamentarian’s position on their party list during the 2001 Sejm election. The range is 1–27, but because of two outliers past the 13th position I recoded the variable so that the maximum was 14. Electoral list position is especially relevant as part of women’s candidate experience; I thus created an interaction term between electoral list position and gender. Gender and list position are correlated, but weakly ($r = 0.24, p < 0.05$).

**Results**

Table 1 illustrates how parliamentarians think about party gender quotas. Overall, 40 percent are for party gender quotas and 60 percent are against. A higher percentage of women (58.8) than of men (34.9) supports the quotas, and the difference is statistically significant. As predicted, statists (52.6) are much more likely than economic liberals (9.1) to support party gender quotas. Predicted differences between anti-clericals (43) and Catholic traditionalists (17.2) are similarly large. Candidate list position is divided into the first two positions (‘High’), safe positions in any district, and the rest (‘Low’). Parliamentarians of both genders who come from the lower end of the candidate list are more likely to be pro-party gender quota.

Examining the combinations of party ideologies, two aspects are noteworthy. First, a third (31.6 percent) of the statist and anti-clerical party SLD–UP, which adopted gender quotas, believe that gender quotas are bad. Coming from a party that has a quota may influence parliamentarian support for quotas, but clearly does not force such a positive attitude. Second, as hypothesized, economic ideology is more important than religious
platform in determining support. Combined with either religious platform, statism is related to the highest levels of support for party gender quotas.

Table 1. Opinion ‘party gender quotas are good’ by gender, party ideology and candidate list position

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Test of difference $p \leq$</th>
<th>N</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>58.8</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party ideology</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statist</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic liberal</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td></td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-clerical</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic traditionalist</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td></td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined party ideology</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statist, anti-clerical</td>
<td>68.4</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>38</td>
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<tr>
<td>Statist, Catholic traditionalist</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic liberal, anti-clerical</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic liberal, Catholic traditionalist</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Candidate list position</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>High (1–2)</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low (3+)</td>
<td>51.3</td>
<td></td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Respondents in this category had a 30 percent party gender quota in the elections of 2001. No other category had a party gender quota.

platform in determining support. Combined with either religious platform, statism is related to the highest levels of support for party gender quotas.

The logistic regression results in Table 2 deal with the specific hypotheses in this article. Model I shows the results for gender, party ideology and candidate list position, while Model II adds the interaction term between list position and gender. The model fit in both cases is significant, with a relatively high Nagelkerke $R^2$ (0.46). All variables are in their predicted direction except for the interaction term. Gender is not significant when in the same model with party platform. Candidate list position, alone or as part of the interaction term, is not significant.

Party ideology dominates both models, showing that the more statist and anti-clerical a parliamentarian’s party is, the greater the chance that the parliamentarian will think that party gender quotas are good. Economic ideology and religious ideology are of the same magnitude, though the standard error is larger for economic ideology.

Various variants to these models are of interest. To begin, in a simpler logistic regression model specifying only gender and party ideology, gender is still not significant. Next, it may be argued that young women are more likely to support party gender quotas than any other group. Young women are not represented in these data (only 13 percent of all women elected to the Sejm in 2001 were below the age of 36). I specified a model with an interaction term of age (as a continuous variable) and gender and included all other variables listed in Table 2; the age*gender interaction term is not significant, indicating that age is not a contributing factor in how women view party gender quotas.
Some may hypothesize that parliamentarians from a party that has already adopted a gender quota are more likely to support gender quotas. This hypothesis cannot be examined with these data, but neither is it necessary. Considering that only one party, SLD–UP, adopted quotas, I cannot construct a variable that distinguishes between the parliamentarian ‘being in a party with a quota’ from being the parliamentarian member of SLD–UP. The substantial variation within SLD–UP on gender quota support, however, allows me to circumvent the problem of possibly biased coefficients. With one-third of the parliamentarians in this party responding that quotas are bad, it means that coefficients are not biased due to lack of differentiation within the only party that adopted quotas.

Some argue that a proper test of the candidate list hypothesis would weight candidate list by party size. The general argument is that winning position on candidate lists is determined by total positions available, given the size of both the party and the district. To weight candidate list position, within each administrative district I applied a three-point ranking scale (3 = large, 2 = medium, 1 = small) for each party based on the number of candidates on their list in 2001. By itself, candidate list position is correlated with the dependent variable ($r = 0.35, p < 0.05$). The strength of the correlation is about the same when weighted by party size. I created an interaction term by multiplying the weighted candidate list position by gender. In a regression model with gender, party ideology, the new candidate list position variable and the new interaction term, the results do not differ substantively from those in Table 2.

Although candidate list is not statistically significant in this model, it is still informative as to the role that male parliamentarians play in party gender quota support. Figure 1 presents the predicted probability of support for party gender quotas by candidate list position, highlighting gender differences. The probability gap between men and women

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**Table 2. Logistic regression of pro-party gender quota attitude on gender, party ideology and candidate list position**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model I</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Model II</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b</td>
<td>S.E.</td>
<td>Exp(B)</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>S.E.</td>
<td>Exp(B)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (woman = 1)</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>2.89</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>3.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party ideology</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>0.96*</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td>0.94**</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>2.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>0.96***</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>0.95***</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>2.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List position in 2001</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>1.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender * list position in 2001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-5.46**</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td></td>
<td>-5.45**</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>74.13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>74.09</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi square</td>
<td>32.53**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>32.56**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagelkerke R²</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>79</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>79</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**p < 0.01; *p < 0.05 (for two-tail test).**
is largest at the highest positions of the candidate list, but narrows considerably at the lowest end. Men’s predicted probability of support is higher than women’s at the lowest levels of the candidate list. Who are these men at the lower end of the candidate list? Taking the point at which these probabilities intersect (the eighth position), these men are all statists and anti-clericals, and seven out of the 10 are pro-party gender quota. Thus, candidate list position is meaningful for understanding men’s support for these quotas only when placed in the context of party ideology.

**Summary and discussion**

I examined three major determinants of parliamentarian support for party gender quotas: parliamentarian demographics, party ideology and candidate list position. The article demonstrates the importance of party ideology in pro-party gender quota support. Logistic regression results indicate that the first hypothesis – that women are more likely than men to support quotas independently of party ideology – is not supported, even in a restricted model with only gender and party ideology as covariates.
In contrast, all party ideology hypotheses – that parliamentarians from statist and/or anti-clerical parties would be more likely to support quotas – receive strong empirical support. In the final regression model, including gender, party ideology, candidate list position and the interaction of gender and position on the candidate list, the only statistically significant effect pertains to party ideology. Both the economic and the religious dimensions of party ideology prove equally important in understanding why parliamentarians would think these quotas are good.

The hypothesis that parliamentarians, women especially, who were placed in hard-to-win positions on the candidate list were more likely to favour quotas is not supported by the data. One possible reason for electoral list position not reaching statistical significance in a logistic regression model may relate to the fact that all respondents won despite their position on the party candidate list; overall, winners may be less supportive of party gender quotas than losers, but, unfortunately, it is not possible to test this idea with the present data.

This research has focused on a particular political context, one in which Polish women are under-represented yet are making small, incremental gains in the absence of electoral and constitutional quota laws. Nonetheless, Poland’s political party structure, ideologies and social and economic contexts are similar to those of other post-communist countries in Eastern Europe to allow for generalizations in this region. Identifying which type of Eastern European parliamentarian would be quota-friendly requires an understanding of the intellectual foundations that underlie normative concerns. Catholic traditionalist parties may see gender as a valid political identity; they may even count on this in mobilizing support for their platforms. However, their gender traditionalist attitudes do not translate into quota support. Anti-clericals are similar to statists in their view of social structure, but when aligned with economic liberalism and its focus on agency, they end up holding negative attitudes to party gender quotas. It is reasonable to expect that, throughout the region, parliamentarians from rightist Christian economic liberal parties would be less likely to support party gender quotas than secular, statist parties. Considering Eastern Europe’s recent turn towards economic liberal, anti-clerical parties, quota supporters will be forced to partner with groups outside government if they are to pressure parties to adopt quotas.

While this study finds that many women parliamentarians in Poland do not, at this time, process the idea of quotas as some gender representation scholars assumed, women’s support for party gender quotas is not the only link between descriptive and substantive representation. Women’s interests consist of more than just quotas, and women parliamentarians are not the only actors in the quota policy process (Celis et al., 2008; Dahlerup, 2006c). Indeed, 35 percent of male parliamentarians in this study support party gender quotas. Moreover, considering that pro-quota men faced potential elimination based on their low candidate list position, men can prove to be supporters of quotas even under difficult conditions.

Change in the ideological composition of the political structure is key to the future of party gender quotas in Eastern Europe. Results in this article suggest that if more women were added to parliament, the likelihood of party gender quota adoption would not necessarily increase. Those wishing to convince parliamentarians in contemporary Eastern Europe to adopt party gender quotas should recognize the importance of party ideology.
Appendix A. Comparison between WebSurvey and POLCAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>WebSurvey</th>
<th>POLCAN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>20.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>79.1</td>
<td>79.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young (21–35)</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle (36–55)</td>
<td>87.2</td>
<td>85.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old (56+)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party(^a)</td>
<td>100(^b)</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of total no. of districts</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List position</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1–3</td>
<td>66.3</td>
<td>67.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4–6</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>15.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7+</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>17.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>460</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\)SLD, AWS, UW, Samoobrona, PiS, PSL, PO, LPR, Mniem.
\(^b\)To ensure confidentiality, the exact percentage for each party that responded to the WebSurvey cannot be revealed. However, response rates per party closely match those of POLCAN 2001.

Appendix B. Party ideology scores in Poland: Economic and religious dimensions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>Economic</th>
<th>Religious</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SLD–UP</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>3.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSL</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PO</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>2.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PiS</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPR</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\)The higher the scores, the more statist or anti-clerical. Adapted from Castle and Taras (2002: 114).

Notes

I gratefully acknowledge Melanie Hughes, Pamela Paxton, Kazimierz M. Slomczynski, Irina Tomescu-Dubrow and Christina Xydias for commenting on earlier versions of this article, and Colin Odden for assistance in collecting the data.

1. Although some argue that the best way to understand policy support in multiparty democracies is by examining parties as the units of analysis (e.g. see Caul Kittilson, 2006), focusing on rank-and-file parliamentarians is appropriate in this case. Some argue that parties exercise more control over individual members than vice versa (Parikh, 1997: 20). In new democracies such as Poland, individuals enjoy considerable influence despite the power of parties: ‘[I]n young democracies, the rules of the game ... are still amenable to alteration by actors seeking advantage’ (Kitschelt, 1992: 9–10). Rank-and-file parliamentarians enjoy enough autonomy to justify a focus on their role in the quota debate.
2. Much of the literature focuses on the dynamic relationship between religion and state socialism as fought by high-ranking members in the Church and in the communist party (Chrypinski, 1990; Mach, 2000; Ramet, 1990).

3. Espousing a belief that women are central to domestic spheres is incompatible with large numbers of women working as parliamentarians; the idea of placing an equal ratio of women to men in parliament is likely to be rejected.


5. POLCAN combined SLD and UP parliamentarians, forcing me to average the scores between them in order to use POLCAN properly.

6. With the map as a grid, Castle and Taras’s party labels fall into cells. In attributing a value for a particular dimension, I applied the following two rules: (1) if the party label is mostly in one cell, then that cell is the score and (2) the lowest possible score rules, such that if the party label is half in one cell, the lowest possible score was attributed to the party. Although Castle and Taras clearly state that party label placement is approximate, the distance from one party to another along a particular axis reflects empirical reality. Note, too, that while inter-party distance can be inferred in the two-dimensional space, the metric is of no particular value other than for making finer distinctions between parties.

7. The beginning of the WebSurvey contained questions related to attitudes to representation and democracy, but for the purposes of this article they are omitted from the equation. One that captures a more global attitude to descriptive representation is worth mentioning. Within the WebSurvey, respondents were asked about descriptive representation as an ideal, worded as: ‘How important is it that the composition of the Sejm reflects the composition of society according to proportions of men and women?’ (N = 79). Response categories ranged from very important to very unimportant. Women were substantially more likely to respond that descriptive representation as an ideal was important to very important (88.2 percent) than men were (37.7 percent), which is a statistically significant difference (p < 0.01). The attitude to descriptive representation as an ideal is slightly different from the attitude to gender quotas, yet the two are moderately correlated (r = 0.44, p < 0.01). Thus, the question about whether the Sejm should reflect proportions of men and women in society captures much the same attitude about party gender quotas and is omitted from the equation. The relationship between descriptive representation as an ideal and economic and religious ideology is strong but curvilinear.

8. The results of these alternative models are available on request. Note that these data do not have information on parliamentarian level of education.

References


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